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The Korean War Never Happened:  
Forgetting a Conflict in  
British Society and Culture  
 
Abstract  
 
This article traces the social and cultural significance of the Korean War in contemporary British society, from 
the initial involvement of British military forces in July 1950 to the unveiling of the first London memorial 
dedicated to the conflict in December 2014. In particular it explores why the Korean War has been labelled the 
‘forgotten war’ of the twentieth century. After an initial surge of concern over the prospect of another world war 
in the summer of 1950, the Korean War was largely viewed as a distant war on a little-known peninsula and was 
continually obscured by the memory of the Second World War. Korea continued to be excluded from British 
national identity and memorial culture into the twentieth century as, unlike the Second World War, it served no 
purpose to subsequent generations. Moreover, the mantle of the ‘forgotten war’ had a discernible impact on how 
British veterans of Korea wrote about their experiences and understood their identity as post-1945 servicemen. 
Using letters, diaries and opinion surveys, as well as contemporary newspaper and television material, this article 
details how the Korean War was understood in twentieth-century and (early twenty-first-century) British culture. 
Moreover, this article calls for a wider reappraisal of ‘forgotten voices’ literature in twentieth-century British 
history writing and a clearer definition of the meaning of ‘forgetting’ to British society and culture.   
 
Keywords: Korean War, Cold War, Memory, Forgetting 
 
Introduction 
 
In his self-published memoir former National Service conscript Ron Larby, wrote: 
 
‘The Korean War Never Happened’ 
2 
 
 Everything and everybody connected with ... Korea just simply sank out of sight.  Years went 
 by during which time I never met anyone who had served in Korea. There were no books in 
 the library and no films about Korea. There was nothing. It was as though it – the Korean  
 War – had never happened. A truly forgotten war.1 
 
Popular history has an abundant supply of books claiming to recover the forgotten voices of modern 
warfare. First-person narratives from little-known conflicts, overlooked theatres of operation, domestic 
contexts or rank-and-file servicemen are all depicted as ‘forgotten’.2 One might even argue that labelling 
such groups as ‘forgotten’ is little more than a helpful publishing strategy. But forgetting plays an 
important part in history-writing. Reinstating ‘forgotten voices’ into the historical narrative has been a 
central feature of social history since at least the 1960s and the lure of recovering lost stories has 
underpinned the historical discipline since French historian Jules Michelet delved into the archives in 
the early nineteenth century.3 Important questions remain about why particular events and figures have 
been ‘forgotten’ in the first place and what it means when a society ‘forgets’ moments in its history. In 
the case of Korea, why has Britain, a country whose national identity was intimately concerned with 
war and the military during the twentieth century, remained largely ambivalent toward a conflict that 
saw the mass involvement of around 40,000 British servicemen and the death of over 1,000 of them? 
 The Korean War (1950–3) has become the forgotten war of modern Britain: from memoirs, 
popular histories and (rare) television programmes, the term ‘forgotten war’ is synonymous with Korea 
in Anglophone culture. The media surrounding the unveiling in December 2014 of the first London 
memorial dedicated to Korea continued to use its infamous ‘forgotten’ label.4 Cold War historian David 
French has argued that the entire post-1945 army remains one of the most ‘forgotten’ in history.5 The 
impact of the Second World War was pivotal in hastening this process of forgetting. Building on the 
                                                          
1 Ron Larby, Signals to the Right, Armoured Corps to the Left (Leamington Spa, 1993), 174-5. 
2 Max Arthur, Forgotten Voices of the Great War (London, 2003); Max Arthur, Forgotten Voices of the Second World War 
(London, 2004); Roderick Bailey, Forgotten Voices of the Victoria Cross (London, 2010); Christopher Bayly and Tim 
Harper, Forgotten Armies: the Fall of British Asia 1941-5 (London, 2004); Gary Sheffield, Forgotten Victory: The First 
World War: Myths and Realities (London, 2002).  
3 Carolyn Steedman, Dust (Manchester, 2001), 69-70.  
4 Joe Shute, ‘Britain’s Korean War veterans win their final fight’, Telegraph, 29 November 2014.  
5 David French, Empire, Army and Cold War (Oxford, 2012), 1–2. 
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arguments of James Hinton, Geoff Eley and Richard Vinen, this article argues that the Korean War was 
eclipsed even at the time by the memory of the 1939-1945 conflict.6 The British population, after an 
initial rush of fear in the summer of 1950 (partially concerned with the potential use of atomic weapons) 
became largely ambivalent towards the distant war in Korea. The ambiguous war aims of the Korean 
War, its distance from the UK and its unsatisfactory conclusion similarly contributed to its ‘forgotten’ 
status. Although many servicemen tried to evoke Second World War ideas of duty, being an ‘underdog’ 
and protecting the world from tyranny, the Korean War never came close to it in the national 
imagination. Neither did it provoke the level of opposition that was later seen against the Vietnam War: 
although the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), elements of the Trade Union movement and 
many left-wing intellectuals opposed the conflict, it never inspired the same levels of mass opposition, 
on either side of the Atlantic. 
  Korea continued to be excluded from British national identity and memorial culture later in the 
twentieth century as, unlike the Second World War, it served no use to subsequent generations. Aside 
from re-runs of M*A*S*H, the Korean War rarely featured on British television in the latter half of the 
twentieth century; the most famous fictional veteran of the conflict – the haphazard hotelier Basil Fawlty 
– was renowned for reasons other than his military service.7  Unlike the Second World War or the 
Vietnam War, Korea was neither lauded nor vilified in British culture. Furthermore, Korea has rarely 
featured in the social history of the period. British historian David Kynaston’s research largely focuses 
on the economic consequences of the war in his study of the post-war Labour government. Elsewhere, 
David Edgerton, whose book Warfare State (2006) puts forward the argument that Britain’s economy 
was still geared up for war – not welfare – after 1945, makes little mention of Korea.8 Korea is 
frequently mentioned in histories of the post-war period alongside the introduction of health services 
                                                          
6 James Hinton, Nine Wartime Lives: Mass Observation and the Making of the Modern Self (Oxford, 2010), 1; Geoff Eley, 
‘Finding the People's War: Film, British Collective Memory, and World War II’, American Historical Review, 106, 3 (2001), 
818-9; Richard Vinen, National Service: Conscription in Britain 1945-63 (London, 2014), xxiv.  
7 M*A*S*H was a long-running television programme (1972-1983), based on a 1969 film of the same name and  followed 
exploits of a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (US Army) in Korea; Basil Fawlty was the title character of the BBC television 
series Fawlty Towers (1975-1979).  
8 David Edgerton, Warfare State: Britain 1920–70 (New York, 2006), 5.  
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charges in 1951 (to cover the costs of rearmament).9 Minister of Health Aneurin Bevan famously 
resigned in opposition.10 Yet these fleeting, almost clichéd, references show we have tended to regard 
the Korean War as an ill-fitting part of the history of the welfare state, rather than analysing it as part 
of the complex legacy of the Second World War, the emerging anxieties associated with the Cold War 
and the end of empire. As a result it has sank into relative cultural obscurity during the second half of 
the twentieth century.  
 However, Korea’s status as a forgotten war has had an enduring impact on those who served 
there. Faced with seeming apathy from younger generations, veterans like Larby have sought out one 
another. Larby argued that the British Korea Veterans Association (BKVA) filled the void of wider 
popular remembrance. His memoir was even produced by a small publishing company, run by another 
veteran which focused solely on veteran memoirs. He and others were therefore able to find the 
recognition which he sought in veterans’ and regimental organizations. This article examines responses 
to the ‘forgotten war’ from veteran memoirists and analyzes how they viewed their experiences and 
role in the post-1945 British Army.  
The case of Korea also shows how forgetting is a vital component in understanding post-war 
societies. Feminist scholar Cynthia Enloe has argued how post-war periods are ‘fraught with gendered 
decisions’ about which ‘selected images’ are privileged over others.11 Such analysis is timely: the 
commemoration of the one hundredth anniversary of the First World War, a monumental four-year 
cycle of public events, memorials and varied cultural outputs, has prompted historians to ask once again 
why certain events are remembered, why others are forgotten and the immense influence of the World 
Wars in shaping British culture and identity. The mnemonic turn in history-writing since the 1980s 
certainly raised such questions before, but the case of the Korean War sheds further light on the politics 
and practicalities of remembrance in post-1945 Britain.  
                                                          
9 David Kynaston, Family Britain 1951-57 (London, 2010), 80; Peter Hennessey, Having it So Good: Britain in the Fifties 
(London, 2007), 219.  
10 Aneurin Bevan, In Place of Fear (Weybridge, 2008), 129.  
11 Cynthia Enloe, ‘Women after wars: puzzles and meanings’, in Kathleen Barry (ed.), Vietnam’s Women in Transition (New 
York, 1996), 313. 
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Although largely beyond the scope of this article, the interpretive aftermath of the Korean War 
also runs in parallel with end of the British Empire. During the last decade, the so-called ‘minimal 
impact’ thesis (arguing that the end of empire had little impact on British culture) has been questioned 
by historians including Stuart Ward, Joanna Bailkin and Bill Schwarz. As historians continue to 
ascertain the cultural impact of foreign affairs on twentieth-century British citizens, it is vital to 
defragment the processes of cultural valorization, public opinion and memory even further.  For 
instance, Schwarz argues that Powellism (stemming from the views of Conservative MP Enoch Powell 
in the late 1960s) was a curious mix of the public wishing to forget and being unable to forget.12 
Elsewhere, David Anderson describes intentional acts of forgetting, or rather silencing, through the 
purposeful destruction of certain files relating to British counter-insurgency tactics in Kenya. In 
destroying this archive, Anderson argues that colonial officials were seeking ‘to edit, to sanitize and to 
censor history.’13 Forgetting thus has many variants and has had a longstanding and powerful impact 
on modern British history.  
 Understanding the significance of the Korean War and its aftermath is also pivotal in 
analysing Britain’s Cold War history: Robert Barnes recently argued that the Korean War was no longer 
forgotten, at least not by the academic community.14 Although this is increasingly the case, few analyses 
have contextualized the Korean War within a British domestic context or address its significance to 
people’s lives. This may be due to the difficulty in mapping the Cold War’s impact on Britain, 
oscillating as it did between short-lived panics and longer-term low-level anxieties. But an analysis of 
Britain and the Korean War can add not only to our understanding of post-war British history, but also 
adds to our broader conceptualisation of the Cold War. As Geoff Eley has argued, the ‘exorbitantly 
conventional binary framework’ that we have used traditionally to characterise post-war Europe falters 
when we examine the Cold War in greater detail; it becomes a set of far ‘messier contingencies’.15  The 
                                                          
12 Bill Schwarz, White Man’s World (Oxford, 2011), 9.  
13 David Anderson, ‘Guilty secrets: deceit, denial and the discovery of Kenya's “migrated archive” ’, History Workshop 
Journal, 80 (2015), 142.  
14 Robert Barnes, ‘Introduction’, in Robert Barnes (ed.), The Korean War at Sixty: New Approaches to the Study of the 
Korean War (Abingdon, 2012), 1.  
15 Geoff Eley, ‘Corporatism and the social democratic moment: the post war settlement, 1945-1973’ in Dan Stone (ed.), 
Oxford Handbook of Post-War European History (Oxford, 2012), 37.  
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‘forgotten war’ of modern British history demonstrates the Cold War’s complexities powerfully, both 
in a national and international setting. This article will first explore the historical approaches to 
forgetting, before briefly setting out the Korean War’s significance within British social history and 
contemporary attitudes towards it during the war itself, before examining in detail how the Korean War 
became ‘forgotten’. This article finishes with an analysis of veteran writing and how being forgotten 
became an identity of its very own. The Korean War thus shows the entwined processes of national 
identity, memory and forgetting at work in the second half of the twentieth century and its ‘forgotten 
voices’ demonstrate the complexity of Cold War culture in Britain and its legacy today. 
 
Forgetting Twentieth-Century Conflict  
 
Since Paul Fussell’s The Great War and Modern Memory (1975) historians have explored the 
relationship between war and memory in great detail. The vast literature produced since the 1980s has 
accelerated this interest, particularly following Pierre Nora’s now seminal Realms of Memory (1996).16 
Within this mnemonic turn, forgetting is largely interpreted as the inverse or absence of remembering. 
Paul Ricoeur describes forgetting as an ever-present fear, lurking behind all memory projects: he calls 
forgetting ‘[a]n attack, a weakness, a lacuna’.17 Similarly, in their fascinating study of the material 
culture of remembrance, Adrian Forty and Susanne Küchler largely interpret forgetting as the opposite 
or failure of remembrance: particular objects denote remembrance, their destruction a desire to forget.18 
This does not mean that the process of remembrance, in contrast, is less complicated. Forty and 
Küchler’s collection shows how, in the case of war memorials for instance, certain groups are excluded 
in favour of others. Nor are remembrance and forgetting divorced processes. As Jenny Edkins has 
argued commemoration can hasten forgetting: memorialising stories of heroism and glory obscure 
trauma, suffering and a wide range of other counter-narratives of conflict.19  
                                                          
16 Pierre Nora, Realms of Memory: Construction of the French Past Vol. 1 (Columbia, 1996).  
17 Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History and Forgetting (Chicago and London, 2006), 413. 
18 Adrian Forty and Susanne Küchler (eds), The Art of Forgetting (Oxford and New York, 1999), 8-10.  
19 Jenny Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics (Cambridge, 2003), 54.  
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 However, Freud argued that forgetting is not just an absence of memory: it is a deliberate act, 
executed by an individual or society – to construct a more comfortable narrative of their lives and to 
remove traumatic episodes which impede their daily psychic existence.20 Forgetting in this instance can 
be a powerful, purposeful act. Forgetting can encompass both the personal repression of painful events 
and the deliberate destruction or omission of unpalatable episodes in a society’s history. According to 
this interpretation, forgetting can even be equated with silencing or erasing, rather than just an 
unintentional failure of memory.  Memory scholar Paul Connerton has described this forgetting as 
‘repressive erasure’, the first of seven types of forgetting.21 Like memory, forgetting also changes over 
time, according to the varying needs and motivations of individuals and societies. In his recent study of 
digital ‘forgetting’ Viktor Mayer-Schönberger has shown that technology now makes remembering (not 
forgetting) the default – the 2015 debates in the European Court of Justice over internet search histories 
and the ‘right to forget’ illustrate this. 22 This is not necessarily a new line of thought: Plato made a 
comparable argument about how writing would change human memory.23 Nevertheless, digital 
technology has given forgetting a pressing importance. Indeed, Tony Judt has remarked that twenty-
first-century policymakers ‘wear the last century rather lightly’ and that forgetting is a hallmark of 
contemporary life.24 
 Historians too are deeply aware of the importance of forgetting. Michael Roth maintains that 
any examination of the past inevitably comes into confrontation with the ‘forces of forgetting’.25 As 
Carolyn Steedman has argued, uncovering ‘forgotten’ items is central to the historian’s work and their 
view of themselves: ‘To enter that place where the past lives, where ink on parchment can be made to 
speak, still remains the social historian’s dream’: in short, the ‘lure of ‘finding it’ drives historians.26 
E.P. Thompson’s famous introduction to The Making of the English Working Class (1963), highlighting 
                                                          
20 Sigmund Freud, ‘Remembering, repeating and working-through’ in J, Strachey (ed.), The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works, Vol. 12 (London, 1958), 148.   
21 Paul Connerton, ‘Seven types of forgetting’, Memory Studies, 1, 1 (2008), 59-71.  
22 Julia Powles and Enrique Chaparro, ‘How Google determined our right to be forgotten’, Guardian, 18 February 2015.  
23 Walter Ong, ‘Writing is a technology which restructures thought’, in Gerd Bauman (ed.), The Written Word: Literacy in 
Translation (Oxford, 1986), 27–31. 
24 Tony Judt, Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century (London, 2009), 3.  
25 Michael S. Roth, ‘Trauma, representation and historical consciousness’, in Michael S. Roth, Memory, Trauma and History 
(New York, 2012), 83.  
26 Steedman, Dust, 70. 
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those previously excluded from the historical narrative, was not just a call to re-orientate the subjects a 
historian should study, but to actively ‘rescue’ historical subjects – through recording, archiving and 
cataloguing – in order to withstand the ‘condescension of posterity’. Peter Barham powerfully 
summarizes this process of retrieval in Forgotten Lunatics of the Great War (2004): ‘I was alerted to 
the existence of this population by a footnote from which it slowly dawned on me that here was a 
cultural mass grave, a “pauper’s pit” ... waiting to be excavated’.27  
 On one level, the criteria for ‘forgotten’ status seem fairly clear. Typically it refers to a 
particular group or story that has been excluded from the dominant historical narrative or that provides 
an alternative dimension to that narrative. Barham describes the ‘forgotten lunatics’ as an 
‘embarrassment’ to officials during the First World War and they remain ‘unjustly neglected’ to this 
day.28 Restoring forgotten voices has thus been a profoundly political act: for example, David Hall notes 
in his study of working-class life that the current plight of post-industrial areas and working-class people 
might be taken more seriously if their experiences are more well-known.29 Another assumption 
underpins such literature: that voices are best represented by first-person narrative. The Imperial War 
Museum’s highly successful ‘forgotten voices’ series offer short, first-person accounts of conflict, 
aiming to catalogue the ‘ordinary’ experiences of a wide range of men and women who witnessed some 
aspect of twentieth-century conflict. Its editor, Max Arthur, stated that ‘[t]hese are their words – I have 
been but a catalyst.’30 Military historians John Keegan and Richard Holmes were influential in placing 
the first-hand narrative centre-stage in the emerging field of ‘new military history’. Keegan described 
his dissatisfaction with the study of weaponry, economics and generals ‘which, by its choice of focus, 
automatically distorts perspective and too often dissolves into sycophancy or hero-worship’.31  Holmes 
also took this stance, noting that military history reduces ‘one of the most passionate of dramas ... to a 
knockabout affair dripping with clichés ... [or] to a desensitised operational narrative in which the 
individual is lost in a welter of arrows on a map.’32 The emphasis on ‘voices’ also contrasted with 
                                                          
27 Peter Barham, Forgotten Lunatics of the Great War (New Haven and London, 2004), 7. 
28 Ibid., 9.  
29 David Hall, Working Lives: the Forgotten Voices of Britain’s Post-War Working Class (London, 2012), 10.  
30 Arthur, Forgotten Voices of the Great War, xii. 
31 John Keegan, The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme (London, 1991), 27-9.  
32 Richard Holmes, Firing Line (London, 1985), 6. 
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officially-commissioned military history, a practice beginning in 1908 where histories of conflicts were 
by illustrious military men or civil servants, in order to teach future generations about particular 
operations. 
 But given the complex meaning of forgetting, is its use in history-writing always justified? The 
Korean War was not the first, or indeed, the last war to be described as forgotten, not least because it 
has proven to be a successful publishing strategy (Arthur’s first book was a Sunday Times bestseller in 
2003). Delving into something ‘forgotten’ implies that it has been untouched by historians and is 
therefore, somehow, more authentic. Arthur and others have used the word ‘raw’ or ‘speaking for 
themselves’ to describe first-person extracts used in his bestselling Forgotten Voices series.33 But as 
Dan Todman points out, these forgotten voices were in fact ones left over from the highly popular 
programme The Great War (1964) and some of these voices (such as Charles Carrington) had hardly 
been side-lined or overlooked.34 The centenary celebrations of the First World War suggest that the war 
is in fact the least forgotten of all modern conflicts. In other cases, the label seems more justified. The 
British Fourteenth Army fighting in Burma between 1942 and 1945 was referred to at the time and 
subsequently as the ‘forgotten army’, so side-lined were its actions. Yet the end of the Second World 
War proved a turning point in the remembrance of British involvement in war: as French argues, almost 
the entire military and its actions could be described as forgotten after 1945.35 Why was this? French 
argues that post-1945 military engagements such as Malaya or Korea did not fit either with Britain’s 
vision of its own post-war domestic history nor its growing sense of its army as only a ‘humanitarian’ 
force. For instance, novelist Graham Greene once referred to the campaign against guerrillas in the 
Malayan Emergency (1946-60) as a ‘forgotten war’, one that saw the constant ‘dripping’ of casualties 
but never a decisive climax.36  
But, aside from the nature of post-1945 conflict, the forgotten wars of the late twentieth century 
also emanate from the legacy of the Second World War itself and a particular kind of forgetting that 
became prevalent. Connerton argues that forgetting can be ‘constitutive in the formation of a new 
                                                          
33 Arthur, Forgotten Voices of the Great War, xii ; Tom Payne, ‘A writer’s life’, Telegraph, 8 November 2004.  
34 Dan Todman, The Great War: Myth and Memory (London, 2005), 211-12.  
35 French, Empire, Army and Cold War, 1. 
36 Graham Greene, ‘Malaya. The forgotten war’, Life, 31 July 1951, 51. 
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identity’.37 In other words, forgetting is an essential part of constructing collective and individual 
identity: all ‘narrative[s] of modernity’ need to forget. In the case of Britain, identity formation in the 
second half of the twentieth century has certainly made use of conflict: war has been central to identity 
formation in twentieth-century Britain. Stephen McVeigh and Nicola Cooper argue that ‘[t]he soldier 
is a national avatar, a foundational figure and is evocative of the history, self-image and identity of the 
nation.’38 Enloe has explored the gendered dimensions to such identity formation in post-war societies, 
noting that from museums to school reports, particular ‘presumptions about masculinity and femininity’ 
are being set out too.39  Elsewhere, Raphael Samuel’s collection Patriotism (1989) sought to question 
the widespread association between national identity and the military, which Margaret Thatcher had 
attempted to claim as the preserve of the political right during and after the Falklands War (1982).40 
The Second World War continued to exert a powerful grasp over national memory for the remainder of 
the century. By contrast, the Korean War could not be used to support this notion of national identity 
Rather than an ‘underdog’ triumphing over unquestionable ‘evil’, Britain had been a junior partner in a 
conflict whose aims, methods and outcomes had been at best unclear, at worst criticized.  
 
The Korean War in British Social History 
 
Before examining how Korea was excluded from national memory, it is important to understand the 
specific circumstances of the war itself, which ultimately contributed to its forgotten status. The Korean 
War was forgotten almost as soon as it began. From 1911 the Korean peninsula was occupied by the 
Japanese and, following the Japanese surrender in the summer of 1945, the United States (US) split 
Korea into two zones divided by the 38 Parallel North. The Moscow Agreement later that year stated 
that a provisional Korean government would be established, supported by the US, Soviet Union, Britain 
and People’s Republic of China (PRC), leading eventually to an independent Korea. However, the US 
                                                          
37 Connerton, ‘Seven types of forgetting’, 63. 
38 Stephen McVeigh and Nicola Cooper, ‘Introduction: men after war’, in Stephen McVeigh and Nicola Cooper (eds), Men 
after War (New York and Abingdon, 2013), 3.  
39 Enloe, ‘Women after wars’, 313.  
40 Raphael Samuel (ed.), Patriotism: the Making and Unmaking of British National Identity (London, 1989).  
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and Soviet Union took different attitudes to the Communist uprising then taking place in Korea. The 
Soviets backed the revolutionary Kim Il Sung in their northern zone, whilst the US largely supported 
the right-wing stance of Syngman Rhee in the south. During the next few years, two politically divergent 
regimes developed on either side of the 38 Parallel – the Communist Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Following rising tensions, on 25 June 1950 North 
Korea invaded South Korea and twenty-four nations offered armed or humanitarian support to South 
Korea and to a US-led United Nations (UN) force. By the autumn of 1950, China had entered the war 
to support North Korea and pushed back the initial UN advance. During the first year of the conflict 
troops moved up and down the peninsula repeatedly, with fighting concentrating around the Parallel 
from mid-1951, when fledging peace negotiations began.   
Britain was among the countries which formed the UN force. In July 1950 the Labour 
government (led by Clement Attlee) committed British naval and later land forces in defence of South 
Korea. An estimated 40,000 British servicemen (with an additional 60,000 from the wider 
Commonwealth) served in Korea and up to 50 per cent of some units were composed of National 
Servicemen, men aged between eighteen and twenty-one and conscripted for eighteen months (extended 
to two years in October 1950).41 They were dubbed by some MPs as ‘citizens in uniform’, but deemed 
‘costly and inefficient’ by others.42 The National Servicemen were joined by recalled reservists from 
the Second World War and a small number of ‘K-Force’ volunteers from across the Commonwealth. 
Britain’s junior role in decision-making in Korea, to some extent contributed to its forgotten status: 
critics in particular pointed out that Britain was subject to the decisions of the US and to the UN. 
Winston Churchill’s Conservative government, which came to power in October 1951, wished to 
maintain the ‘special relationship’ that Churchill himself had engineered.43 However, more recent 
historical research has shown that Britain in fact managed to exert influence at the UN and mediated 
                                                          
41 Gordon L. Rottman, Korean War Order of Battle: United States, United Nations, and Communist Ground, Naval, and Air 
Forces, 1950-1953 (Westport, 2002), 126; Vinen, National Service, 285. Vinen notes that the official total was never 
released.  
42 Parliamentary Debates (Commons) 512, 9 March 1953, 844–910; Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 472, 20 March 
1950, 1559–622.  
43 Anonymous, ‘Mr Churchill on Korea’, The Times, 29 June 1950, 3; Anonymous, ‘Mr Churchill on Britain’s “enduring 
strength”‘, The Times, 18 January 1952, 4.  
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some of the decisions of the US.44 Britain had its own agenda and motivations for involvement. David 
Kynaston argues that the memory of 1930s appeasement had not faded and that the cabinet wished to 
support the US (and, as Sean Greenwood notes, their aid to post-war Europe).45  Callum Macdonald 
adds that they also wished to promote the UN’s collective security principles and maintain British 
interests and ‘Commonwealth harmony’.46 US policy in the Far East did, however, make consecutive 
British governments uneasy. Greenwood and Macdonald argue that both Labour and Conservative 
governments were keen, from long before the North Korean invasion, to mediate the US policy towards 
China. Policymakers in Britain had largely accepted that mainland China was now a Communist state 
and that the Chinese nationalists on the island of Formosa had no great political sway: in 1950 US 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson (1893–1971) had yet to be convinced that this was the case.47  
 Korea and China were not, however, Britain’s only major foreign policy commitment at this 
time. 40,000 British troops were deployed in Malaya and the British Army were also present in Kenya 
(where the Mau Mau Rebellion was suppressed in 1952) and in Singapore. It is essential to analyse the 
British role in Korea in the context of decolonization, not only because of concomitant military 
manpower commitments, but also because many commentators at the time felt that Britain’s apparent 
skill at dealing with ‘satellite states’ would be helpful in Korea. In one BBC television programme from 
1950 stated that the British could ‘claim some credit for being the first to see the magnitude of the 
problem’ in countries like India, Pakistan and Burma and had granted them independence as a result.48  
 The initial press treatment of the Korean War similarly reflected on Britain’s mediating 
presence, particularly given the presence of more controversial figures in US and ROK leadership. One 
such figure was General Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964). He was initially been praised by some parts 
                                                          
44 William Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History (Princeton and Oxford, 2002), 129;   
Thomas Hennessey, Britain’s Korean War: Cold War Diplomacy, Strategy and Security 1950–53 (Manchester, 2013), 3-4; 
Robert Barnes, ‘Branding an aggressor: the Commonwealth, the United Nations and Chinese intervention in the Korean 
War, November 1950 – January 1951’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 33, 2 (2010), 231–53. 
45 David Kynaston, Austerity Britain, 1945–51 (London, 2008), 546; Sean Greenwood, ‘“A war we don’t want”: another 
look at the British Labour government’s commitment in Korea, 1950–51’, Contemporary British History, 17, 4 (2003), 2. 
46 Callum Macdonald, Korea: the War before Vietnam (Basingstoke, 1986), 84.   
47 Sean Greenwood, Britain and the Cold War (Basingstoke and New York, 2000),  87; Callum Macdonald, Britain and the 
Korean War (Oxford and Cambridge, MA, 1990), 15; Macdonald, Korea,  22; Peter Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War 
(London and New York, 1986), 154.  
48 BBC Written Archive (BBC), Home News and Entertainment, ‘Korea in world politics’, 8 September 1950, S322/85/1. 
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of the press: one Daily Mail reporter called him the ‘man of today’ at the outbreak of war. 49 By April 
1951, however, Labour Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison (1888–1965) was concerned that 
Macarthur’s naval exercises off the coast of China, and his talk of atomic weaponry, would provoke the 
Chinese and reduce the likelihood of peace talks.50 When Macarthur was dismissed later that month, 
having continued his quest to push beyond the 38 Parallel in April 1951, seemingly ignoring President 
Harry Truman’s wishes, The Times heralded Truman’s action as courageous.51  Popular opinion was 
similarly critical of South Korea’s leader, President Rhee (1875–1965). The vehemence of anti-Rhee 
sentiment in Britain in 1950 has been overlooked by some popular historians of the Korean War, who 
dismiss this widespread disapproval as merely a product of ‘left-leaning’ historiography.52 Yet from 
late 1950 political and popular opinion was wary of expanding the war any further and unpredictable, 
bellicose characters who could spark a wider war (like Macarthur and Rhee) were criticized by both the 
political left and right. In 1953, suspicion of Rhee increased still further as in June he allowed North 
Korean prisoners to escape, destabilising already fragile peace negotiations.53 The Member of 
Parliament Kenneth Younger (1908–1976), who had been Acting Foreign Secretary during the early 
stages of the war due to the illness of Ernest Bevin, said in the Commons: ‘It is very tragic that, after a 
truce has been held up ... for some two years through the intransigence of the Communist side about 
relatively unimportant matters, it should now be in danger owing to the fanaticism of Syngman Rhee 
and his failure to understand why United Nations is in Korea at all.’54 A report in The Times 
characterised Rhee’s move as ‘the Korean tail ... wagging the United Nations dog.’55 Elsewhere, the 
Trades Union Congress (TUC) received impassioned letters from Trades Council from across the 
country calling for it to deplore Rhee’s actions.56  
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 Yet despite these concerns, the social impact of the war was somewhat limited, particularly as 
the war went on. Winston Churchill famously quipped that he had ‘never heard of the bloody place till... 
[he] was seventy-four.’57 Tony Shaw explains how the British Foreign Office faced a difficult task in 
explaining involvement to the wider public, as most people felt that ‘Britain had no economic or 
strategic interest in Korea’.58 A Foreign Office document, sent to Attlee in 1950, noted that Korea was 
‘remote’ and the threat posed by its instability was ‘indirect and not immediate.’59 In one BBC 
programme aired on 26 June 1950, the presenter stated that ‘the outbreak of fighting in Korea has come 
as a very unpleasant suprize [sic] to the British and United States governments’.60 Another programme 
stated that ‘[v]ery few people on that Sunday morning were quite sure exactly where Korea was’.61 It 
was stated that the war had not been planned, but that it was necessary for the protection of democracy. 
However, another programme (aired in September 1950) explained the principle of Communist 
interference in the Korean conflict: ‘[At the] back of all this lies the clash between the intolerant and 
uncompromising ideology of the Communists … and the very different views of the Western nations, 
anxious to preserve the freedom to live their lives’.62 These motivations were echoed in other films at 
the time, such as the Crown Film Unit Men of the World (1950), where the British soldier was seen as 
the bulwark against ‘the threatening years’ in which Britain now finds itself.63  It is important to note, 
however, that in-depth programmes on Korea were largely restricted to the early months of the conflict: 
subsequent reports (by the BBC and companies such as Pathé News) were prompted only by particular 
campaigns such as the infamous Battle of the Imjin River in April 1951 and by the truce in 1953 
(programming for which the BBC had been discussing since early 1952).64 By 1952, as one Daily Mail 
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editorial noted, the Korean War had largely became a ‘slumbering war’: it was being forgotten, even 
before the end of the war. 65    
 But how did British people themselves respond to these media representations? Mass 
Observation (MO) surveys conducted in the summer and autumn of 1950 are a helpful, if imperfect, 
indicator of popular feeling. On one level, these surveys are potentially one of the first lenses onto 
attitudes toward conflict in post-1945 Britain.66 Moreover, James Hinton argues that although to some 
extent ‘unrepresentative’, MO responses can show how individuals conceptualise both themselves and 
‘more general historical processes’.67 Claire Langhamer too states that at its best MO responses are 
‘richly imbued with the popular as well as individual memories’.68 So although MO responses are far 
from uncomplicated, unmediated glimpses into people’s lives, they can provide examples of how 
individuals think of themselves within large-scale historical contexts like the Cold War. There are 
numerous examples upon which we might draw. Whilst some people saw Korea as a civil war on a 
distant peninsula, many people debated whether the Korean War would be ‘world war three’, with most 
concluding it would not as ‘Russia is not ready yet’. Many of those surveyed still felt that ‘old Joe 
Stalin’ was behind the troubles. One man argued that: ‘I don’t see why we should be talking of a war 
so soon after the last. All these young fellows they’ve only just got back into Civvy Street [and] they 
want to settle down to a home and family – they don’t want to be involved in another war[.] ... [I]t’s 
none of our business.’ Another man agreed, noting that: ‘Myself I’ve been thro[ugh] two wars, I’ve had 
enough. As far as the present situation goes – we should have left it alone’. Although Edgerton has 
dismissed the idea that Britain was a ‘weary titan’ in the immediate post-war years, the MO surveys 
illustrate some degree of war weariness or a desire to ‘settle down’. A significant number of respondents 
(both male and female) claimed that women were particularly concerned about another war. One woman 
in Victoria stated that:  
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All the women round our way are ... worrying what it’ll all turn to, after all we’ve been through 
and the young fellows just growing up after living in shelters and evacuation[.] ... They’re 
frightened to look ahead; they’re just getting things nice and ‘straight’ and they want to live in 
peace and quiet – no woman wants any more war. 
 
Several other respondents noted that it was ‘the women who were taking it worst.’ Although the MO 
survey represents only a small sample, these comments nevertheless show the domestic context in 
which the Korean War took place, particularly the prevailing discourse over gendered citizenship. Lucy 
Noakes and Susan Grayzel have argued that citizenship remained persistently gendered in the twentieth 
century and split along ‘passive’ and ‘active’ lines – ‘with women and children largely as victims and 
men as defenders of the home’.69  Civil defence in the early Cold War replicated these ideas, focusing 
on ‘women and children first’ in domestic strategies of evacuation and protection. This language did 
change later (albeit only slightly) with the activism of campaigns against nuclear weapons later in the 
Cold War.70 Korea was therefore not a turning point in this respect.  
 Nevertheless, these surveys testify to the enduring legacy of the Second World War in shaping 
– and eclipsing – experiences of Korea. Even in early 1950, the possibility of ‘total war’ was widely 
discussed among MO respondents and some presumed, like the female respondent in Victoria, that the 
war would be fought in the skies above London once more. The potential use of nuclear weapons, 
mooted by Macarthur before his dismissal in April 1951, added a further layer of anxiety. One woman 
from Fulham stated that: ‘We haven’t forgotten the last war and this one will be worse still with the 
Atom Bomb’. One respondent linked this to the US: ‘It is a disgrace: the Americans will have England 
blown to smithereens [.] ... We’re the stooges of America.’ References to the atom bomb were frequent, 
but many dismissed its threat arguing that it will never be used. Furthermore, once it became clear that 
nuclear war was not going to be unleashed, much of the concern dissipated. Although no comparable 
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MO data exists any later than autumn 1950, Kynaston has noted that news of the Korean War was even 
eclipsed by August with the birth of Princess Anne.71 After an initial period of fear, there were fewer 
references to Korea in national newspapers and the Houses of Parliament: even in July 1950, the MO 
surveys stated that there was no increase in newspaper sales (as typically happened in wartime).72 One 
veteran later stated that even in 1952, he was already ‘beginning to feel like a forgotten soldier from a 
forgotten war.’73 In the same year Christine Knowles, founder of a fund for British prisoners of war 
which had been running since 1918, proclaimed angrily in a newspaper interview that she had ‘“never 
known times when men were fighting when so little has been done for them by the people at home”’.74   
 Not all British people were apathetic. Certain regions, especially those associated with 
particular regiments such as the Middlesex Regiment (the ‘Diehards’) or the Gloucestershire Regiment 
(the ‘Glorious Glosters’, many of whom were taken prisoner in April 1951) continued to run ‘local boy’ 
features.75 Korea also prompted opposition, particularly from the British Communist organizations, 
trade unions and leading left-wing academics. Regarding the capture of Seoul in 1950 by the US, E.P. 
Thompson wrote in one satirical poem’[s]o many souls were liberated on that day/ Out of their cage of 
skin and freed into the airs./ It is curious that a buzzard ate the speeches/ And odd that flies should have 
blown on the prayers.’76 Anti-Americanism was rife in intellectual circles in the 1950s. Criticising their 
Cold War stance in a poem entitled ‘Cold Warrior’ published by the Labour Monthly in 1950, James 
Aldridge wrote: ‘Listen America;/ Death is a braggart/ In their apple-pie hands, and/Liberty is 
beggared/at their milk-fed lips.’77 It was not only intellectual circles that prompted opposition: the TUC 
received over sixty letters in the last year of the war alone from Trades Councils, calling on it to take a 
firmer stance opposing American and South Korean handling of the war.78 Yet there were many people, 
from the Cabinet to Mass Observation respondents, who felt that the war was part of Britain’s 
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continuing duty. In a news response survey of July 1950, the majority of respondents felt that it was 
‘right’ that the US was involved in Korea, even if they feared the consequences.79 One respondent even 
noted that ‘they are not doing any more than we are doing in Malaya or Greece.’ This argument is 
corroborated by Kynaston, who cites a 1950 Gallup poll which found that 78 per cent of respondents 
supported increased defence expenditure.80 The British serviceman still represented the maintenance of 
international law and the British ‘common will to order’. In this way, the Korean War was no different 
from what had come before: it merely substantiated, rather than changed, widely-held views about 
Britain’s military duties and capabilities.81  
So despite its economic and political importance, the Korean War failed to fully capture public 
attention beyond the summer of 1950, contributing to a growing sense among servicemen that they had 
been forgotten. As noted, this was compounded by Britain’s junior role in the war and by the general 
lack of knowledge about the peninsula. Yet the overshadowing effect of the Second World War, evident 
in MO responses, is also an indication of the function of forgetting in post-war societies, as set out by 
Enloe and Connerton. The Korean War, occurring immediately after the Second World War, coincided 
with a period of concerted identity formation in Britain, where certain ‘images’ or events were more 
attractive than others. Korea’s inability to fit within established narratives of British identity and self-
conception is thus key to understanding its forgotten status across the second half of the twentieth 
century. 
 
Forgetting Korea 
 
There were several key stages in this process. The first was the end of the conflict in 1953. An uneasy 
armistice agreement was signed on 27 July at Panmunjom following years of negotiations, after 
diplomats settled the main point of contention – the destination of repatriated prisoners of war. The US 
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did not wish to force its Korean prisoners to return to a Communist state if they did not want to, but the 
Chinese insisted that all prisoners return to their own countries, as set out by the Geneva Convention. 
Tensions eased in 1953: Macdonald argues that the key driver behind reinvigorated talks that summer 
was the death of Stalin in March 1953.82 The truce was intended to be the first step to a more stable 
political solution, but talks on reunification in Geneva in 1954 broke down and Korea remains to this 
day a highly volatile region. Charles S. Young argues that the undistinguished military record of the US 
in Korea (the UN were ‘twice in danger of being driven into the sea’) led it to its lack of remembrance 
in American popular culture.83 More significantly, the unclear aims of the war and the frequent stalling 
of peace talks from 1951 meant that the armistice was not celebrated, despite the fact it marked a major 
concession for Communist China over ‘voluntary repatriation’.84 As Young argues ‘Washington was 
left with very little salvage for a usable past.’85 
  Likewise, the unclear ending of the conflict did little to integrate the war into British narratives 
of conflict. Added to this was the feeling that Britain had only played a subsidiary role at best.  In July 
1953, Member of Parliament Walter Eliot summarised the situation: ‘This has been a great war in which 
we have not played the major part. Such a thing is almost unknown[.]... Let us not take up a self-
righteous position. Nothing annoys us more than to find other people, who have not suffered as much 
as we, coming forward ... and giving us wonderful advice about how things should now be arranged.’86 
Korea was not seen as part of Britain’s ‘usable past’ or a positive sign for its future. Nor was this 
sentiment limited just to policymakers. On 31 July 1953, Bury Free Press reported the bemusement 
with which the citizens of Bury St. Edmunds viewed the UN flag flying above the council offices, 
marking the end of the war. The reporter lamented that it all seemed ‘so remote’ and that Britain's long-
awaited Ashes victory in 1953 gained more attention: ‘What a scathing commentary upon the times in 
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which we live! For what was true of West Suffolk was true also of the country as a whole. The forgotten 
war ...[has] come to an almost unnoticed end.’87  
 Even more significant was the process of memorialization of the Second World War underway 
in the 1950s. As both James Hinton and Michael Paris have argued, the Second World War’s legacy 
became central to the national narrative to the extent that it eclipsed subsequent conflicts in popular 
culture.88 In the early 1950s the image of the Second World War was solidifying as a morally 
unimpeachable conflict, where Britain had ‘stood alone’ in 1940 and eventually conquered tyranny. 
The liberation of the Nazi concentration camps at Buchenwald and, in particular, Bergen-Belsen 
cemented this narrative during the late 1940s and 1950s.89 By the late twentieth century, as Judt points 
out, such events and names had been solidified as a ‘pedagogically serviceable Historical Chamber of 
Horrors’.90  Korea coincided with the start of this process. During the Korean War, younger servicemen 
referred to the experiences of Second World War soldiers, compared to their own. Robin Bruford-
Davies, an officer taken as a prisoner of war during Korea, mentioned in an oral history interview that 
his father, who had been a soldier before him and ‘had just finished a war said “right, you must go out 
with some proper clothes”’, knowing the particular importance of keeping hands and feet warm.91 The 
Second World War was still the defining, moral conflict of the era. In a letter to his girlfriend, Valerie 
Wassell, National Serviceman Keith Taylor wrote: ‘[The] trouble with this war, Val, is this. There’s no 
object. Everything anyone does is normally done for a reason. In the last war it was “Berlin or bust”. 
Out here what is it? To capture Pyongyang, the capital? ... What? No one knows, except something 
called vaguely the peace of the world and what does that mean to the average soldier? Nothing at all.’92   
  There was even concern during the war amongst senior officers that servicemen needed more 
guidance in the war’s aims. Macarthur’s successor General Ridgway asked for a memorandum to be 
read to all allied servicemen in January 1951 entitled ‘Why We Are Here’.  The memorandum reiterated 
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that servicemen were fighting for societal, political and even religious values which underpinned 
collective Western society.93 Chief of the Imperial General Staff William Slim (1891–1970) emphasised 
this message to returning soldiers from Korea:  
 
 [Y]ou earned the admiration, not only of your own country and of all Nations fighting in 
 Korea, but the hearty respect of the enemy[.] ... Most important of all you have helped to 
 strike a blow in the defence of the free world which has, I think, done much to lessen the 
 likelihood of further wars. You’ve done something to be proud of; be proud of it.94 
 
Yet when Benjamin Welles of the New York Times was asked on the BBC radio programme London 
Forum what the aims of the Korean conflict were he commented: ‘I think the average G.I. has no 
objective in mind[.] ... I think that the senior officers and the political leaders of the United States have 
one stated objective, and that is to repel the aggression of North Korea at least as far as the 38 Parallel.’95 
It was not surprising too that the British public failed to rally around this war aim and Korea became 
‘forgotten’ in the canon of twentieth-century conflict.  
 More broadly, this ambiguity demonstrates the uneasy position of the Cold War itself in British 
national narratives. Peter Hennessey points out that the Cold War was never a ‘people’s war’.96 Nor 
was this just because of the smaller numbers involved as numbers of soldiers on the ground do not 
necessarily transpose into enduring public memory. In post-war Germany, for instance, 63,000 British 
servicemen were stationed in 1951 alone, yet British involvement never became a central feature of 
British self-identity.97 Britain’s unclear relationship with its Cold War commitments was summed up 
by one commentator in 1971, who wrote that ‘deterrence can be boring, as much for the public in Britain 
as for the soldiers and airmen’.98  
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 Neither, as the years went by, did the Korean War speak to contemporary trends or conflicts. 
Even during the early 1960s, Korea was being regarded as the prelude to Vietnam, the latter conflict 
becoming steadily more unpopular during the early 1970s.99  At the time of the Falklands War in the 
early 1980s, for example, Margaret Thatcher’s government appropriated the memory of the Second 
World War, promoting military endeavour and “duty” as part of resurgent nationalism. Korean veterans 
were profoundly aware of their exclusion from such rhetoric. The Falklands War coincided with the 
retirement of many veterans, a time which, psychologist Nigel Hunt argues, leads to greater reflection 
on military service and trauma.100 It also coincided with the first large-scale oral history projects with 
Korean War veterans, such as the National Army Museum’s ‘Project Korea’ in the late 1980s. Both the 
Second World War and the Falklands are constant reference points in these interviews.  Jarlath 
Donnellan was proud to mention how the model of machine gun he used in Korea was also used in the 
Falklands.101 Veterans also higlighted the difference between the popular reception of the Falklands 
War and the Korean War. Jim Jacobs asked at the end of his memoir: ‘will the public at large retain an 
interest? ... Like Korea, will the Falklands and [the] Gulf have faded from public memory all by 
excepting those who will proudly proclaim, “I was there, that was my war”.’102 The Falklands War 
made Korea’s omission even more stark to its veterans, who had by that time began to reflect on their 
experiences and found a British public seemingly disinterested in the cause for which they had fought.  
 
Writing the Forgotten War: Veteran Life-Writing 
  
For the servicemen who fought in Korea, however, the war was not easy to forget. Derek Halley wrote 
in his memoir:  
 
 I remember the forgotten war. Disraeli was wrong: if time were the ‘great physician’ I 
 would have forgotten long ago. But who was he, anyway? Just another politician  who never 
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 saw Korea[.] ... The government may have locked their records away but  mine are staring me 
 in the face. I can’t forget the madness which savaged more people in three years than 
 Vietnam did in ten.103 
 
Paul Fussell has argued that feelings that the domestic world has forgotten its soldiers are fairly common 
among front-line servicemen.104 Nevertheless, Halley’s directionless anger at all politicians (even those 
of the previous century) represents a broader resentment by the Korean War generation at the lack of 
recognition they received within British memorial and popular culture. The final section of this article 
addresses how these veterans have written and understood the ‘forgotten war’.   
 Veterans frequently reference the ‘forgotten war’ motif in their life-writing. National 
Serviceman Private Russell Edwards wrote in his 2008 unpublished memoir that, until he became 
involved in the BKVA, his medals lay ‘cast aside in a drawer, forgotten, from a forgotten war’.105 Others 
call for the conflict to feature more in political decision-making. Former intelligence officer Anthony 
Perrins claimed that the ‘forgotten’ status of the Korean War did ‘not make ... [him]  unhappy, except 
that there were those whose selflessness and courage should not go untold; and if the inevitable mistakes 
made by the politicians and the military are forgotten, they will surely be repeated.’106 Similarly S.G. 
Buss noted, in an edited collection on the Korean War, that he would not be angry at the ‘forgotten’ 
status of the war if it was not for the fact that the same ‘mistakes’ were being made by contemporary 
governments.107 
  There is also potentially another level of forgetting at work. If we return to Ron Larby’s 
statement that the ‘Korean War never happened’, on the surface this corroborates Halley’s reading of 
Korea as a forgotten war. But when reading Larby’s statement we are also reminded powerfully of Jean 
Baudrillard’s argument that the Gulf War ‘did not take place’. Baudrillard argued that the conflict in 
fact primarily took place through hackneyed media representations and clichés of war. The ‘fake and 
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presumptive warriors, generals, experts and television presenters’ used familiar ideas to ‘signify’ the 
event of the war. This meant that the conflict in the Gulf had ‘been anticipated in all its details and 
exhausted by all the scenarios’.108 The memory of the Second World War on the Korean War generation 
meant that every action of theirs had also been anticipated, and it was thus overlooked, its unique 
characteristics forgotten. In this way, the Korean War ‘never happened’. 
 Perhaps Baudrillard’s claim that war takes place through media representations as much as it 
does on the battlefield can be seen in Korean War veterans’ awareness of the textual tradition in which 
they were writing. Veteran Anthony Perrins lamented that ‘no Robert Graves, Wilfred Owen, or 
Siegfried Sassoon has emerged. Neither has a Pat Barker, Sebastian Faulks or Louis de Bernières been 
inspired to write of life in Korea during the period.’109 Similarly, upon his return home, Norman Davies 
commented on the discomfort he felt compared to his military-literary forebears: ‘Being an avid reader 
it seemed to me that fictional characters, when they arrived home from a distant land or a distant war, 
enthused over the journey as they neared their homes and their loved ones. So what was the matter with 
me?’110 There was an expectation that servicemen would tell their stories and that society would listen 
and respond. For instance, some servicemen in Korea made specific reference to Sassoon and Graves 
in their letters and writing.111 But there are few memorials to the Korean War, still fewer novels and 
films. The only British film, A Hill in Korea (1954), starred a young Michael Caine, fresh back from 
Korea himself.112 The most famous and mocked fictional veteran of the Korean War – Basil Fawlty – 
has his experience in Korea summarily dismissed in one episode of the popular 1970s TV programme 
Fawlty Towers. Basil whispers threatening to his wife Sybil that: ‘I fought the Korean War you know, 
I killed four men’. Ignoring Basil, Sybil simply says to two passing guests: ‘He was in the Catering 
Corps – he used to poison them.’113 
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Faced with this apparent apathy, the Korean War veteran community have taken up the mantle 
of the ‘forgotten war’ as a way of defining themselves. Anthony Farrar-Hockley, a former British army 
officer taken captive in Korea, addressed a BKVA group in 2000, saying that although they were 
forgotten, they had followed orders and fought for what was ‘right’. 114. Just as Connerton argues that 
forgetting can be ‘constitutive in the formation of a new identity’, so too can being forgotten. This was 
particularly true for National Servicemen: Vinen states that Korea quickly acquired a reputation as a 
‘uniquely unattractive posting’ and even for those who did not go, the war had led extended all 
conscripts’ time in the forces.115 Forgotten on a national level, the war retained and even gained a special 
significance for veterans, regimental and National Service organisations. 
 
Conclusion  
 
It was against this background of apathy that servicemen explored their experiences in Korea. The 
Korean War had seemingly ‘not happened’, although not in the Baudrillardian sense of a media 
outpouring obscuring the actual conflict. In fact the opposite was true: the public’s apparent apathy 
meant that the war had not been reproduced or represented enough. Television, so integral to public 
history, similarly overlooked the Korean War. Max Hastings presented the BBC programme The War 
in Korea (January 1988) and historian Bruce Cumings produced Channel 4’s Korea: the Unknown War 
(July 1988).116 Yet these two programmes were insufficient in publicly remembering the Korean War: 
for instance, The Unknown War only had 669,000 viewers for the first programme (compared with eight 
million who had watched the first episode of The Great War in 1964 or 2.6 million who watched 
Testament of Youth in 1979).117 Despite an outpouring of military-related programmes on British 
television, Korea has remained ‘forgotten’ across media forms.  
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 In the 1950s, the Korean War coincided with a post-war society seeking to fashion its identity 
in the wake of the Second World War and for later generations its inconclusive narrative fell outside 
Britain’s ‘usable past’. Will this change in the twenty-first century? In recent years, Korea has featured 
more in remembrance celebrations than it did for much of the twentieth century. Notably, Korean War 
veterans took a high profile role in Armistice Day commemorations in Whitehall on 11 November 2013. 
Prompted by the anniversary of the ceasefire at Panmunjom (and the passing of the World War 
generations), veterans were invited to march past the Cenotaph: five hundred veterans, the largest group 
on the day, took part. The following year, the first London memorial was unveiled to the Korean War 
on Victoria Embankment. 
 
 
Illustration 1: Korean War Memorial, London. Photograph by the author, 2016.  
 
 But the conflict has yet to occupy a dominant position in national memorial culture and, as this 
article has shown in tracing the genealogy of the Korean War in British society and culture, forgetting 
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still matters to Korea’s veterans. It serves either as a rallying point of common identity with other 
veterans, or as label to rail against. In 2012, the Royal Horticultural Society Chelsea Flower Show Best 
in Show was awarded to Jihae Hwang for ‘Quiet Time: DMZ Forbidden Garden’. BKVA organiser 
Alan Guy declared that ‘[t]he final chapter of this story is that the Korean War has been brought to the 
attention of the public via television, the radio and the Internet and … [Jihae Hwang’s] team are to be 
commended for their fine effort to make sure that “We are NOT Forgotten”.’118 Whether this ‘final 
chapter’ is enough to integrate the Korean War into British culture and society after half a century of 
oversight remains, at present, unlikely.   
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